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Revenge on Revenge Porn: International
Approaches to Protecting Privacy Rights
January 2, 2019
by Mary Kate O’Connell
Under Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, the privacy of individuals is protected from interference and
attacks. However, the advent and evolution of the internet has created new ways for users to
violate privacy that are difficult to regulate and prevent. One such modern privacy violation
is revenge porn, which can be broadly defined as the distribution of sexually graphic images of
individuals without their consent.
As access to the internet has provided individuals with the ability to search and share information
quickly and easily, revenge porn has become a mechanism used by abusers and harassers to
diminish their victim’s privacy. The three major forms of revenge porn include Nonconsensual
Pornography, which can be defined as the distribution of private, sexually explicit images of
individuals without their consent; Recorded Sexual Assault, which involves using the image or
video capture of a sexual assault– typically by a rapist– to further humiliate a victim and/or
discourage them from reporting the crime; and Sextortion, which is the act of threatening to
expose a nude or sexually explicit image in order to get a person to do something such as share
more nude or sexually explicit images, pay someone money, or perform sexual acts.
While several countries have been successful in criminalizing revenge porn, criminalization has
required legislators to balance the human right to freedom of expression with the human right to
privacy. Both of these basic human rights are governed by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. In order to craft effective strategies to
punish distributors of revenge porn, countries have had to be creative in ensuring such strategies
do not unintentionally infringe on the right to freedom of expression. As discussed below,
international approaches to protecting individuals from revenge porn have included defining it as
a breach of civil law under defamation and including it as part of existing sexual violence
statutes. While these approaches have been comprehensive, they have almost all led to conflicts
with existing country protections of the right to freedom of expression.
Last November, Senator Kamala Harris introduced the ENOUGH Act, or the Ending
Nonconsensual Online User Graphic Harassment Act of 2017. The goal of this act is to amend
Title 18 of the United States Code to include a provision that would make it a federal crime to
“knowingly distribute a private, visual depiction of an individual’s intimate parts or of an
individual engaging in sexually explicit conduct, with reckless disregard for the individual’s lack
of consent to the distribution, and for other purposes.” A vote is likely to occur soon on the
ENOUGH Act once the Senate Committee on the Judiciary completes the markup process. The
potential effectiveness of the ENOUGH Act can be analyzed through a critique of international
legal approaches to combating revenge porn.
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In the United Kingdom, a law was passed in 2015 to criminalize all forms of revenge porn.
Within the first six months of the law being enacted, 175 cases of revenge porn were reported,
but very few people were convicted of the crime. The sentencing for convictions of revenge porn
under the UK law imposes a maximum sentence of two years in prison with no additional fines
or required protections for the victim. Criminalization of revenge porn in the UK illustrates the
negative aspects of the idealistic view that proponents of criminalization hold. While
criminalization may increase reporting of revenge porn, it creates difficulties in punishing
distributors of revenge porn since evidence for the criminal trials are often scarce. Additionally,
the relatively low maximum sentence for those convicted of revenge porn does little to address
the legal needs of victims. Without the ability to recover damages due to the law being a criminal
statute, the victim is likely unable to receive monetary relief for the harm caused, which may
have required them to take expensive measures to further protect their privacy. In terms of free
speech, the law provides exceptions for journalistic material, but nonetheless it has
been criticized by organizations such as English PEN and Article 19, who argue that the law
criminalizing revenge porn is too broad and requires more exceptions for artistic expression.
In Iceland, revenge porn has not been criminalized, but distributors of revenge porn are
prosecuted under Iceland’s Tort Act, which includes decency and defamation clauses. An
example of the effectiveness of this approach is demonstrated in a case regarding
the conviction of a 19-year-old for distributing naked pictures of his ex-girlfriend online without
her consent. In this case, the distributor of revenge porn was required to pay his victim $1,800 in
damages. By allowing victims of revenge porn to recover damages, Iceland’s approach to
combating revenge porn provides both a deterrent for distributors to commit further acts of
revenge porn, while also providing victims with reparations for the harm caused. However,
without a possible prison sentence, some distributors of revenge porn may not view the possible
$1,800 in damages as a deterrence. Revenge porn is a malicious act, and unfortunately, many
distributors could view the benefit of revenge as outweighing the high monetary punishment. In
comparison to the United Kingdom, Iceland’s efforts to combat revenge porn have not
encountered as much criticism from free speech activists. This is likely due to how Iceland
classified the act as a tort, but it could also be a result of the Icelandic popular opinion that
censorship is beneficial, as evidenced by Iceland’s proposition of a law to ban all online
pornography.
Currently, in the United States, forty states and the District of Columbia have laws
criminalizing revenge porn, but the passage of the ENOUGH act would make the distribution of
revenge porn a federal crime. The possible effects of the passage of the ENOUGH act can also
be predicted by looking at similar state-level laws prohibiting revenge porn. For example,
in New Jersey, revenge porn acts are criminalized as acts of harassment and distributors of
revenge porn are prosecuted as harassers. The criminalization of revenge porn in New Jersey has
made it easier for victims of the horrific crime to be granted restraining orders against their
abusers/harassers. This criminalization in New Jersey has also extended the scope of such
restraining orders by requiring the abuser/harasser to remove all images/videos of their victim
from the internet. Additionally, someone found guilty of revenge porn under New Jersey’s law is
ordered to pay a fine of up to $30,000 and can be sentenced to three to five years in prison. With
this combination approach to sentencing, New Jersey’s law is effective in achieving a balance
between deterrence, rehabilitation, and justice for the victim when it comes to punishing
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perpetrators of revenge porn. No lawsuits have been filed yet regarding the New Jersey law, but
similar laws in Arizona and Texas have been at the center of lawsuits the extent to whether the
laws are unconstitutional because they infringe on the first amendment right to free speech.
While the ineffectiveness of the UK and Icelandic approaches to combating revenge porn
provide a negative view of criminalizing or reclassifying the horrific act, the effectiveness of
New Jersey’s law criminalizing revenge porn gives an optimistic outlook to the possible impact
of the ENOUGH act, if passed. Harassers, abusers, and distributors would be deterred by the
monetary fine and rehabilitated by the possible jail sentence, and victims of revenge porn would
be able to receive both monetary reparations for and protection from harm.
However, the approaches in Iceland and the United Kingdom to combating revenge porn make
clear that the implementation of revenge porn laws, whether criminal or civil, often does not lead
to predicted or desired results. Effective revenge porn legislation must protect the rights to both
privacy and the freedom of expression, and it must be able to address the ever-evolving cyber
means to distribute revenge porn. Lawmakers should keep in mind that privacy is essential to
free speech, and that the right to privacy applies equally to all. Privacy, just like freedom of
speech, must be defended, and combatting revenge porn is one step in defense of both rights.
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U.S. Refugee Resettlement: Presidential
Authority and Congressional Oversight
February 25, 2019
by Betsy L. Fisher[1]
Introduction
Each year the President issues a Presidential Determination (PD) setting the number of refugees
to be admitted to the United States in the upcoming fiscal year,[2] a decision that news coverage
has widely discussed in recent years.[3] President Obama, seeking to demonstrate U.S.
leadership in the Syrian refugee crisis, sought to resettle at least 10,000 Syrian refugees in Fiscal
Year 2016 and established a PD of 110,000 refugees for Fiscal Year 2017—then a twenty-twoyear high.[4] In one of President Trump’s first official acts after his inauguration, he ordered the
PD for Fiscal Year 2017 to be lowered to 50,000 before issuing consecutive, all-time low refugee
PDs of 45,000 for Fiscal Year 2018 and 30,000 for Fiscal Year 2019.[5]
Historically, advocates paid less attention to the process by which the PD for refugee
resettlement is set. Congress established this process in the Refugee Act of 1980 and, despite
many complaints,[6] Congress has not amended the process since.[7] While the 1980 Refugee
Act has advanced legislators’ goals of facilitating longer-term policy making and planning for
refugee resettlement,[8] the Act does not provide for refugee resettlement to continue if a PD is
not issued prior to the start of a fiscal year. The consequences for an Administration failing to
comply with the procedural requirements set out in the Act are borne not by the Administration,
but by refugees who are waiting for resettlement.
This article examines those procedural requirements and proposals for legislative reform,
proceeding in three parts following this introduction. Part II addresses the anomalous procedural
requirements of the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), whose annual
admissions number is set by the President in consultation with Congress. Part III discusses the
shortcomings of the current statutory structure, namely the failure to provide for continued
resettlement in the absence of a Presidential Determination. Part IV evaluates legislative
proposals for reform and the extent to which they would address this shortcoming.
Background Information: Congressional Consultation Requirements in the Presidential
Determination Process
Congress has extensive authority over who can be admitted to, removed from, and naturalized in
the United States.[9] As a result, Congress sets the numbers of authorized admissions for most
immigration programs in advance, allowing either a predetermined number of visas for each
category each year, or allowing visa issuances to as many individuals who qualify.[10]
By contrast, the 1980 Refugee Act established the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and
delegated to the President the decision of how many refugees to admit each year.[11] In setting
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up this structure, legislators sought to establish equality in treatment of various groups of
refugees, and to allow an Administration to establish longer-term refugee policy rather than
addressing refugee situations on an ad hoc basis.[12] Yet, Congress did not blindly assign the PD
to the President without reserving an oversight role for itself:[13] the refugee ceiling for each
fiscal year “shall be such number as the President determines, before the beginning of the fiscal
year and after appropriate consultation [with Congress], is justified by humanitarian concerns or
is otherwise in the national interest.”[14]
The 1980 Refugee Act sets out a multi-step process for setting the PD and appropriate
consultation. First, prior to the start of the fiscal year, the President is to submit information to
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on the number of refugees in need of resettlement,
and the President’s “anticipated allocation of refugee admissions.”[15] The Administration is
expected to provide a list of information to Congress “[t]o the extent possible . . . at least two
weeks in advance of discussions in person by designated representatives of the President with
such members.”[16] This information essentially requires the President to provide a rough draft
of the PD and an explanation to Congress as to how the President reached this preliminary
decision. In practice, administrations have satisfied this requirement by publishing a document
called “Proposed Refugee Admissions” for the upcoming fiscal year.[17]
The next step is to hold “appropriate consultations,” defined as “discussions in person by
designated Cabinet-level representatives of the President” with House and Senate Judiciary
Committee members about the information provided by the Administration and to additionally
inform Congress of the global refugee situation, impact of refugee resettlement on the United
States, and other information.[18] The statute imposes a “consultation” requirement, not a
reporting or briefing requirement, indicating an intent that Judiciary committee members should
have the opportunity to state their opinions with the possibility of influencing the final PD rather
than just to receive information passively. However, the Act does not describe how the
Administration is to receive or weigh input from the Committee members during or after the
consultations.[19]
“As soon as possible” after these consultations are initiated, the Judiciary Committee members
are to print “the substance” of the consultation in the Congressional Record.[20] Prior to issuing
a final determination, Congress is to hold a hearing unless there are safety concerns preventing a
public hearing.[21] Only after these steps are followed is the President to finalize the
determination. All of these steps are to occur prior to the start of the fiscal year.[22] The
Presidential Determination can be increased to allow for greater refugee admissions in the fiscal
year if
the President determines, after appropriate consultation, that (1) an unforeseen emergency
refugee situation exists, (2) the admission of certain refugees in response to the emergency
refugee situation is justified by grave humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national
interest, and (3) the admission to the United States of these refugees cannot be accomplished
under [the Presidential Determination issued prior to the start of the fiscal year].[23]
Legal Analysis: Shortcomings of Current Consultation Requirements
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While the 1980 Refugee Act sets out a roadmap for issuing the annual Presidential
Determination, the statute’s primary challenge is the lack of means for refugee admissions in a
new fiscal year until the President issues a PD. Most of the requirements listed above are
mandatory, which is to say that Congress has stated that the President or Administration “shall”
carry out these statutes. When an Administration is unwilling to carry out statutory requirements,
though, the statute does not specify a means for Congress to force the Administration to comply.
The clearest consequence of failing to carry out these procedures is that the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program is unable to admit refugees until the President issues a PD.
Perhaps, since Congress does not have tools to enforce the procedural requirements of the Act,
Administrations regularly ignore the procedural requirements in several respects. The statute is
clear that the Presidential Determination “shall” be set prior to the start of the fiscal year; in
several years, though, the PD was issued after the start of the fiscal year.[24] A hearing is
required, but no such hearing was held any time in Fiscal Year 2018. The statute is unambiguous
that consultations should be “in person” and with Cabinet-level representatives of the President.
The consultations for Fiscal Year 2019 were held over video-teleconference.[25] Congress
clearly intended that consultations provide an opportunity for Congress to provide meaningful
input; members of Congress have complained in recent years that the consultations are pro forma
“discussions” held only after a final decision is made.[26] The content of the consultations are to
be published in the Congressional Record, but, perhaps because they are not public proceedings,
the consultations have not been published in the Congressional Record for several years.
These issues came to a head in the consultation processes for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019, both
of which elicited strong responses from Judiciary Committee members. In August 2018, after
expressing frustration with the Fiscal Year 2018 process, the Senate Judiciary Chairman and
Ranking Member wrote to administration officials to begin the process of scheduling
consultations.[27] Still, the Fiscal Year 2019 consultations process started only after Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo had already announced number of refugees to be resettled, forcing a State
Department spokesperson to clarify that Congress would, in fact, be consulted before the PD was
finalized.[28] Those consultations were held over video-teleconferencing and after the start of
the fiscal year.[29]
Nearly four decades after the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act, Congress should amend the
Act to address a situation in which the President does not follow statutory requirements for
congressional consultation and does not issue a PD prior to the start of a fiscal year. Several bills
since 1980 have proposed amendments to the process. None of the bills have been enacted; two
would address this statutory shortcoming, and one presents a viable legislative solution.
The Refugee Resettlement Extension Act of 1988[30] would have required the initial report’s
submission to Congress no later than June 1st.[31] The House and Senate Judiciary Committees,
rather than the President, would then be responsible for moving forward with the remaining steps
in the consultations process.[32] This would do little to remedy the situation of the last two years
in which the President has simply delayed consultations and held only superficial consultations.
It also does not state what should happen in the absence of a Presidential Determination at the
beginning of the fiscal year.
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The Refugee Program Integrity Restoration Act of 2016 would limit Presidential authority by
setting a default Presidential Determination of 60,000—significantly lower than the historical
average—and requires congressional approval for a Presidential Determination to be set above
this level.[33] This bill would limit the need for consultations and allow for admissions without a
Presidential Determination. However, its cap of 60,000 is artificially low, particularly when
compared with historical averages,[34] and indeed, other provisions of the bill show that the
legislation is clearly intended to limit refugee resettlement rather than to improve the
resettlement process.[35]
The Refugee Protection Act of 2016 would have adjusted the consultation process by allowing
refugee admissions to continue if the President did not issue a Presidential Determination.[36] It
would also require the President to initiate consultations by May 30 of the preceding fiscal
year.[37] By requiring consultations to begin earlier, it would have increased the likelihood that
consultations would be held and that the PD would be issued prior to the beginning of the fiscal
year. It thus would have strengthened the arrangement of congressional and executive
collaboration without fundamentally reallocating authority. Crucially, it would have allowed
refugee resettlement to continue without a PD and without arbitrarily curbing refugee
resettlement as the Refugee Program Integrity Restoration Act would do. The Refugee Protection
Act’s PD provisions have one primary weakness: they peg ongoing arrivals in the absence of a
PD to the previous year’s PD. The PD has varied from 110,000 to 30,000 in the span of the last
three fiscal years, demonstrating the wisdom of pegging refugee admissions without a PD to a
broader historical average. Nonetheless, the Refugee Protection Act provides the strongest of the
three legislative proposals.
Conclusion
The Refugee Act of 1980 has been a remarkable success, but its procedural requirements have a
key flaw: the punishment for an Administration’s noncompliance is inflicted on refugees who are
waiting for resettlement. Congress should amend the Refugee Act so that refugees can continue
to access refugee resettlement if the President fails to issue a Presidential Determination.
[1] Betsy L. Fisher is the Policy Director of the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP).
[2] Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (hereinafter INA).
[3] See, e.g., Victoria Macchi, US Sets Refugee Admissions at Historic Low, Voice of America
(Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.voanews.com/a/us-sets-refugee-admissions-at-historiclow/4600218.html; Julie Hirschfield Davis, White House Weighs Another Reduction in Refugees
Admitted to U.S., N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/us/politics/trump-refugees-reduction.html; Conor
Finegan, Trump Administration Planning to Cap Refugees at 45,000 for Next Fiscal Year, ABC
News (Sept. 27, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-admin-capping-refugees-45000fy18/story?id=50140408; Maya Rhodan, President Obama: U.S. Will Accept 110,000 Refugees
from Around the World, Time (Sept. 20, 2016), http://time.com/4501924/barack-obama-refugeeincrease-united-nations/ (each discussing the refugee ceiling as determined by the President).
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[4] Migration Policy Institute, U.S. Annual Refugee Resettlement Ceilings and Number of
Refugees Admitted, 1980-Present, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/datahub/charts/us-annual-refugee-resettlement-ceilings-and-number-refugees-admitted-united.
[5] Julie Hirschfield Davis, Trump to Cap Refugees Allowed into U.S. at 30,000, a Record Low,
N.Y. Times (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/us/politics/trump-refugeeshistoric-cuts.html.
[6] House Judiciary Committee, Goodlatte Calls on Trump Administration to Immediately
Provide Refugee Consultation (Sept. 20, 2018), https://judiciary.house.gov/pressrelease/goodlatte-calls-on-trump-administration-to-immediately-provide-refugee-consultation/;
Office of Senator Charles Grassley, Grassley, Feinstein: Congress Requires More Thorough
Engagement with State Dept. on Refugee Numbers (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-feinstein-congress-requires-morethorough-engagement-state-dept-refugee (hereinafter Grassley and Feinstein Statement); Office
of Senator Charles Grassley, Grassley Statement on Refugee Consultation with State
Department (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassleystatement-refugee-consultation-state-department (hereinafter Grassley Statement) (each
expressing concerns from Judiciary Committee members about consultations with Congress on
refugee admissions).
[7] Pub. L. 96–212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
[8] 125 Cong. Rec. S2630-2631 (daily ed. March 13, 1979) (hereinafter Statement of Sen. Ted
Kennedy).
[9] Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (noting that “over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” than over immigration law”)
(internal citation omitted).
[10] See, e.g., INA, supra note 2, at § 201 (determining the level of immigration to the United
States for most immigrant visa categories).
[11] Id. at § 207(a)(2) (stating that “the number of refugees who may be admitted under this
section in any fiscal year after fiscal year 1982 shall be such number as the President determines,
before the beginning of the fiscal year and after appropriate consultation, is justified by
humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national interest.”).
[12] Statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy, supra note 8.
[13] INA, supra note 2 at § 207(d); see also 125 Cong. Rec. H1310–12 (daily ed. March 13,
1979) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman); S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong. (1979) at 2; 126
Cong. Rec. H4708–21 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (each supporting the 1980 Refugee Act and
noting the congressional consultations requirement).
[14] INA, supra note 2, at § 207(a)(2)-(3).
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[15] Id. at § 207(d)(1).
[16] Id. at § 207(e).
[17] See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Services, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2018 (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/docsforcongress/274613.htm.
[18] INA, supra note 2, at § 207(e).
[19] Id. at § 207(e).
[20] Id. at § 207(d)(2).
[21] Id. at § 207(d)(3).
[22] Id. at § 207(a)(2)-(3).
[23] Id. at § 207(b).
[24] Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of State (Oct. 4, 2018) (issuing the Presidential
Determination for FY 2019 on Oct. 4, 2018); Presidential Determination on FY 2006 Refugee
Admissions Numbers and Authorizations of In-Country Refugee Status Pursuant to Sections 207
and 101(a)(42), respectively, of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and Determination
Pursuant to Section 2(b)(2) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, as Amended (Nov. 1,
2005), 70 Fed. Reg. 65,825 (issuing the Presidential Determination for FY 2006 on Oct. 24,
2005); Presidential Determination on FY 2002 Refugee Admissions Numbers and Authorizations
of In-Country Refugee Status Pursuant to Sections 207 and 101(a)(42), Respectively, of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and Determination Pursuant to Section 2(b)(2) of the
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, as Amended (Dec. 7, 2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 63,487
(issuing the Presidential Determination for FY 2002 on Nov. 21, 2001).
[25] Rebecca Rainey, Politico Morning Shift, Politico (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-shift/2018/10/02/unions-wary-new-nafta-358683.
[26] Grassley and Feinstein Statement, supra note 6; Grassley Statement, supra note 6 (each
expressing concerns from Judiciary Committee members about consultations with Congress on
refugee admissions).
[27] Office of Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein, Grassley Push for Meaningful Refugee
Consultation with Administration (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=9F32953A-CB90-4B6FA8AF-F08AC900DEDD.
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[28] Reuters, Trump will Consult with Congress on Refugee Cap: State Department (Sept. 18,
2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-pompeo/trump-will-consult-with-congresson-refugee-cap-state-department-idUSKCN1LY2W7.
[29] Id.
[30] Refugee Resettlement Extension Act of 1988, S. 2605, 100th Cong. § 4 (1988).
[31] Id. at § 4(a).
[32] Id. at § 4(b).
[33] Refugee Program Integrity Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4731, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016)
(amending INA § 207 to read “the President may submit to Congress a recommended number of
refugees”.).
[34] Migration Policy Institute, supra note 4.
[35] See, e.g., Refugee Program Integrity Restoration Act of 2016, supra note 33, at § 9
(prohibiting resettlement in a state or locality if state or local officials have taken action officially
disapproving of resettlement); id. at § 13 (limiting refugee status for individuals who were not
specifically targeted); see also Niskanen Center, Statement for the Record of the Niskanen Center
Submitted to The House Committee on the Judiciary Legislative Markup on “Refugee Program
Integrity Restoration Act of 2016” (March 16, 2016), (noting that the bill’s “provisions reduce
the number of refugees who may enter the United States”).
[36] Refugee Protection Act of 2016, S. 3241, 114th Cong. § 21 (2016).
[37] Id. at § 21(3)(B)(ii).
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Mexico: The New Holding Cell for the United
States
February 26, 2019
by Victoria Kadous
On January 29, 2019, the United States took the first action in its plan to send non-Mexican
asylum seekers back to Mexico while waiting for their asylum hearings as per the new Migrant
Protection Protocols (MPP) policy. The first migrant returned to wait in Mexico under this plan
was Honduran and since then the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers returned to
Mexico are from Central America. MPP was passed in response to the severe backlog of asylum
cases in the United States and a general skepticism of the validity of asylum claims. Currently, it
can take several years for an asylum case to come before an immigration judge. Additionally,
the Trump administration does not believe that many of the asylum claims are valid. The
migrants are being sent back through the Tijuana port of entry currently but use of other ports is
expected in the near future. About twenty migrants are expected to be returned to Mexico every
day.
Mexico has agreed to accept the asylum seekers for the time being unless they have health
problems, are unaccompanied minors, or would be in danger in Mexico. Advocates have spoken
out against sending asylum seekers back to Mexico though, claiming the country is unsafe for
migrants who are regularly kidnapped by criminal gangs and smugglers. A lawsuit filed by rights
groups on February 14, 2019, alleges that being forced to wait in Mexico is almost as
dangerous as remaining in some parts of Central America, because of increased risks of
“kidnapping, disappearance, trafficking, sexual assault and murder, among other harms.” In
addition to possible danger in Mexico, advocates have argued that migrants sent back to Mexico
would not have easy access to their legal counsel in the United States, making the process for
seeking asylum more difficult.
The actions of the United States are contrary to its human rights obligations under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention), later codified in 8 USC § 1158; and the International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Under Article
14 of the UDHR, “[e]veryone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.” Under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the principle of nonrefoulement prohibits a state from returning a refugee to a situation where his or her life or
freedom would be threatened on account of a protected ground. This Convention was later
codified, making it domestic law. Title 8, Section 1158 of the U.S. Code states that the only time
an asylum seeker may be sent to a third country is when “the alien’s life or freedom would not be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion, and where the alien would have access to a full and fair procedure for
determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary protection.” Further, under Article 5(a) of
the ICERD, there is a guaranteed right to not be discriminated against due to nationality or ethnic
origin when appearing in front of tribunals and all other organs administering justice.
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By refusing to allow certain asylum seekers to remain in the country, the United States is
violating Article 14 of the UDHR. Based on reports of the violence in Mexico, the United States
is violating obligations under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 8 USC § 1158 by
sending asylum seekers to Mexico rather than allowing them to remain in the United States
throughout the asylum process. Further, the rampant discrimination based on nationality under
this protocol violates Article 5 of the ICERD. This is because under the MPP, only asylum
seekers at the Mexican border and only asylum seekers who are not Mexican citizens will be
held in Mexico. This discrimination is based on nationality of asylum seekers and serves to
deprive them of equal access to asylum seeker services within the United States. By being held
in Mexico, asylum seekers have a harder time meeting with United States lawyers and are being
forced to make their cases under more dangerous conditions than other asylum seekers entering
the United States.
While there are clearly increasing asylum seeker backlogs in the court system, the practical
deprivation of attorney services to a select group of asylum seekers kept in another country will
not serve to fix this issue as much as place an undue burden and risk on those seeking asylum.
The U.S. government has multiple obligations under both international and domestic law that
prohibit it from sending asylum seekers to another country simply because they are from Central
America. If the U.S. government wants to avoid costly litigation, it should bring the MPP in line
with its legal obligations.
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Another Assault on Indigenous Land: The
Battle Against the British Columbia Pipeline
March 12, 2019
by Shelsea Ramirez
The hereditary chiefs of the Wet’suwet’en Clans of British Columbia are protesting the British
Columbia pipeline that is being built by the TransCanada subsidiary company Coastal GasLink.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in British Columbia are carrying out an interim
injunction from the British Columbia Supreme Court issued in mid-December 2018. The
decision allows the company to begin pre-construction of a 416-mile pipeline that will cross the
traditional territory of the Wet’suwet’en Clan. TransCanada claims to have permission from all
twenty of the elected councils representing the First Nations of British Columbia for the entirety
of the project, but demonstrators argue that the project is moving forward despite the outcry from
the hereditary leaders of the Wet’suwet’en Clans. By moving forward with the British Columbia
pipeline, the TransCanada company is violating a 1997 Canadian Supreme Court
decision, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, which protects the existing aboriginal rights and title
to land in the territory.
The First Nations of British Columbia have a distinct political and legal system that predates
colonization, with both hereditary chiefs and band councils speaking on behalf of the
community. Hereditary chief is a title passed down through families, and the hereditary chiefs’
roles are largely viewed as protecting the territory and the interest of the people. The
Wet’suwet’en hereditary chief structure is made up of five clans and thirteen houses. Band
councils, on the other hand, are a form of elected governance introduced by the Canadian
government through the Indian Act of 1976. The representatives on band councils are subject to
elections held every two years. The band councils’ roles differ in each clan, although they are
largely seen as administrators between the federal government and the First Nations. The New
York Times reports, “A spokeswoman for Coastal GasLink, Jacquelynn Benson, said in an email
that the company respects both leadership systems and has held 120 meetings with Wet’suwet’en
hereditary chiefs since 2012, as well as logging 1,300 phone calls and emails with them, trying to
reach a solution” because the hereditary chiefs have opposed the pipeline for years.
In the Delgamuukw case, the Supreme Court upheld Indigenous peoples’ claims to lands that
were never ceded by treaty. The Court affirmed that section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act of
Canada protects “Aboriginal title” as an “existing aboriginal right,” and this includes the right to
exclusive use and occupation of land in a manner consistent with the group’s attachment to the
land. Further, the Court implemented a three-part test to determine if the indigenous nations
demonstrated Aboriginal title. The indigenous nations had to prove sufficient, continuous and
exclusive evidence of territorial occupation. Although claims to the land were recognized, the
Court never distinguished which of the two indigenous nations involved in the case, Gitxsan and
Wet’suwet’sen, had title to the land where the pipeline is being protested. Although the
indigenous nations chose not to move forward with another court case to determine the issue, it
remains an issue between the First Nations.
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By moving forward with the pipeline without the consent of the hereditary leaders of the
Wet’suwet’en people, the TransCanada Company and effectively the Canadian government are
blatantly disregarding the Wet’suwet’en people’s governance structure, undermining the rights
of the indigenous people, and extinguishing any claim they might have on the land. They are also
violating the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) Article 18, which
states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters
which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with
their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making
institutions,” and Article 19, which requires states to consult and cooperate in good faith with
indigenous peoples through their own representative institutions to receive free, prior and
informed consent before adopting and implementing administrative or legislative measures that
may affect the indigenous people. It should be noted that Canada initially voted against the
adoption of the declaration in 2007; however, Canada has since removed its objector status and
officially adopted UNDRIP. Although it is not a legally binding instrument under international
law, the government of British Columbia also promised to uphold the articles in UNDRIP.
A separate reconciliation process is underway between the Wet’suwet’en people’s hereditary
chiefs and the Canadian government to discuss title, rights, laws, and traditional governance. It is
not directly linked to the pipeline project, but it will open necessary doors to include the
hereditary leaders in decisions regarding the territory. There continues to be an ongoing
case where the interim injunction originated, and the case is expected to be heard in court by
May at the latest. If Canada and the local British Columbian governments intend to stand by their
earlier declarations regarding UNDRIP, they must recognize the rights of the Wet’suwet’en
people.
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Struggling to Survive: The Devastating
Impact of the Minas Gerais Dam Collapse on
Indigenous Populations in Brazil
April 12, 2019
by Victoria Kadous
On January 25, 2019, a Brazilian dam collapsed, killing hundreds of people in the Brazilian state
of Minas Gerais. The dam was owned by a Brazilian company, Vale SA, and was designed to
hold back iron ore waste. The collapse flooded the small southeastern city of Brumadinho along
with multiple Vale buildings. In the days following the collapse, multiple search parties looked
for missing persons and surveyors found dead fish and trash over ten miles away from the mine
collapse in the Paraopeba River.
Coverage of the January 25 tragedy focused on how this was not the first time Vale has had to
answer for a deadly dam failure. In 2015, another one of the Vale dams in Minas Gerais broke,
killed nineteen people, caused hundreds to be relocated, and left 250,000 residents without
drinking water. The most recent dam collapse has led to a re-evaluation of the circumstances
surrounding the 2015 dam collapse and concern for the stability of the six hundred other dams in
Minas Gerais which have been deemed at risk of rupture.
In addition to the growing number of deaths from the dam collapse, the lasting effects of the
collapse are threatening the survival of indigenous communities. In particular, the Pataxó
indigenous group lives along the Paraopeda River and use it to bathe, fish, and water plants.
These communities have been told to refrain indefinitely from using the contaminated river
water.
Discriminatory placement of hazardous waste disposal sites near lower income populations is a
current problem in other nations such as the United States. Companies regularly choose cheap,
low income areas to set up their waste disposal facilities and then fail to properly safeguard
against dangers to the surrounding communities. Multiple arrests occurred following the Vale
dam collapse because of the possibility of criminally poor maintenance of the dams and
disregard of warning signs that the dam was unsafe. Vale knew about the dangerously unstable
condition of the dam back in October of 2018, almost three months prior to the collapse. Despite
knowing that the dam’s chance of collapse was twice the maximum risk the company’s own
guidelines allowed, the company neglected to take action.
Under Article XIX of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (ADRIP),
indigenous persons have a right to live in healthy environments. This includes the right to
manage their lands in a sustainable way and to protect their lands from the deposit of harmful
substances while placing a requirement on states that they “shall establish and implement
assistance programs for indigenous peoples for such conservation and protection, without
discrimination.” In addition, the right to a healthy environment is further guaranteed by Article
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11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, which Brazil has
ratified. For years, Brazil’s indigenous populations have protested the placement of dams on and
near their lands. These efforts have been thwarted by companies who develop the dams despite
protest and simply compensate indigenous communities after the damage is already done. The
most recent dam collapse and subsequent awareness of the instability of hundreds of other dams
throughout Brazil proves that there are some consequences of developing on or near indigenous
lands which cannot be resolved with a check.
The new Brazilian president, Jair Bolsonaro, has already taken steps to diminish tribal rights in
Brazil. President Bolsonaro transferred the power to designate indigenous lands to the Ministry
of Agriculture at the beginning of January 2019 just after dismantling Brazil’s bureau of
indigenous affairs. Researchers claim that these actions potentially foreshadow the complete
annihilation of whole indigenous tribes in Brazil. These movements of the Brazilian government,
coupled with the recent catastrophe of the Vale dam collapse could quickly lead to more than just
a couple Vale executives facing jail time. Brazil owes a duty to its indigenous people to reinstate
their rights and allow them to protect them from future catastrophes.
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The Decline of Indigenous Legal Protections
in Guatemala
April 22, 2019
by Mary Kate O’Connell
In mid-January, thousands of indigenous Guatemalan citizens took to the streets to protest the
country’s recent actions to remove human rights protections for the indigenous community. Over
the past year, Guatemala’s president, Jimmy Morales, made tactical efforts to discredit
the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Such efforts can be
attributed to the UN-backed international institution’s investigations against President Morales
and his family for suspected corruption. On January 7 2019, President Morales expelled CICIG,
a move that garnered international attention for the potential negative effect on the capacity of
Guatemala’s judicial system to pursue justice for violations of indigenous human rights. On
January 17, 2019, soon after Morales expelled CICIG, the Guatemalan Congress announced an
amendment to The National Reconciliation Law. If approved, this law would grant amnesty to
those convicted of crimes against humanity in connection with Guatemala’s thirty-six-year civil
war, the victims of which predominantly belonged to the indigenous community. These recent
moves by the Guatemalan government have come after 200 attacks against indigenous human
rights defenders were reported in 2018, a number that is likely to be higher in 2019 given these
new changes to institutional protections for rule of law. Both the expulsion of CICIG and the
amendment to the National Reconciliation Law pose significant risks to the country’s obligations
to protect indigenous peoples from impunity.
Guatemala’s thirty-six -year civil war, which occurred from 1960-1996, claimed the lives of
more than 200,000 Guatemalans, the majority of whom belonged to the country’s indigenous
Mayan community. The war began as a conflict between a military-controlled government
against a left-wing insurgency and largely occurred in the Guatemalan countryside and
mountainous areas, where the population was primarily Mayan. As a result, the government
brutally attacked and burnt down many Mayan villages entirely to avoid the guerilla insurgency
from gaining more traction. In 1999, a United Nations (“UN”) truth commission set up as part of
Guatemala’s supervised peace accords released a monumental report. The report revealed that
the Guatemalan government was culpable for more than ninety percent of the 42,000 human
rights violations that occurred during the civil war. The report further concluded that the Mayan
community suffered the most from the civil war, and that the war consisted of “aggressive, racist,
and extremely cruel violations that resulted in the massive extermination of defenseless Mayan
communities.”
Following the 1996 peace accords, Guatemala enacted The National Reconciliation Law. In its
original form, this law was used by Guatemalan national courts to prosecute and convict leaders
of the Guatemalan government who partook in the violence during the civil war that resulted in
near-genocide of the Mayan community. The National Reconciliation Law, until recently, had
been heralded by the international community as a legal model of how to fight institutional
impunity for serious human rights violations. In 2013, Guatemala became the first country to
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convict a former dictator of genocide when The National Reconciliation Law was used to
convict Efrain Rios Montt. Rios Montt took control of Guatemala through leading a military
coup in 1982 and directed and oversaw the killings, kidnappings, torture, and disappearance of
hundreds of thousands, mainly Mayan, Guatemalan citizens. During his trial, he was found
responsible for, among other acts, the massacres in 15 Ixil Mayan villages, which resulted in the
killing of over 1,771 unarmed women, men, and children. In November 2018, The National
Reconciliation Law was used to prosecute and convict Santos Lopez Alonso, a former
Guatemalan soldier. He was convicted for his involvement in the Dos Erres Massacre of 1982, in
which 200 people were killed in the primarily Mayan village of Dos Erres.
Now, the amendment to The National Reconciliation Law, if adopted, would conflict with
international obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights, which limits
adoption of amnesty for crimes against humanity. The amendment would within twenty-four
hours result in the release and amnesty of dozens of former governmental officials and military
leaders, who were convicted for forced disappearances, mass executions, rape, and genocide.
The amendment would also immediately halt the ongoing investigations into the abuse and
violence that occurred during the civil war. Michele Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, has referred to the possible consequence of this amendment as “complete
impunity for all those involved in truly horrendous violations, including crimes against
humanity.” This amendment to a law that fights impunity for human rights violations has the
potential to cause retaliation against victims, witnesses, judges, organizations, and lawyers who
helped convict the former government and military officials. However, as noted by High
Commissioner Bachelet, international standards limit the adoption of amnesty for crimes against
humanity, most notably the American Convention on Human Rights, which was ratified by
Guatemala in 1978.
Efforts to restrict the ability of Guatemalan institutions such as CICIG to fight impunity have
received international criticism from the UN for violating the state’s international obligation to
protect the human rights of all citizens. The amendment to The National Reconciliation Law can
be viewed as part of the Guatemalan government’s latest efforts to restrict the power of
Guatemala’s institutions against corruption and impunity. One of these institutions is the
International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG), which President Morales expelled from
the country on January 7, 2019. CICIG was created and backed by the UN and the European
Union and can be defined as a hybrid anti-corruption body that uses international investigators
and national prosecutors to identify and prosecute criminal networks and corrupt government
officials from the civil war. In November 2018, CICIG reported that it had worked with
Guatemala’s Attorney General to prosecute more than 680 people and to gain convictions for
310 cases involving influence peddling and illegal campaign financing. Although President
Morales was elected in part because of his anti-corruption platform with the campaign slogan
“Neither corrupt nor thief,” he stopped supporting CICIG’s anti-corruption efforts beginning in
2017 when CICIG implicated him and his political part for campaign finance violations. Most
recently, CICIG opened an investigation into President Morales and his brother on corruption
charges, leading President Morales to banish CICIG’s commissioner from Guatemala, refuse to
renew CICIG’s mandate, and expel CICIG in its entirety in January.
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Some have referred to President Morales’ expulsion of CICIG as part of his slow-motion coup to
gain a military stronghold in the country similar to that which existed during the civil war.
However, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court has limited President Morales’ power and has
issued a provisional injunction reversing CICIG’s expulsion for unconstitutionality since the
creation of CICIG was ratified by Guatemala’s congress. Additionally, the UN deemed the
expulsion impermissible and confirmed that CICIG would continue its work in Guatemala.
By expelling CICIG and proposing an amendment to The National Reconciliation Law, the
Guatemalan government, led by President Morales, is allowing the state to fall back on its
obligation under the American Convention on Human Rights to protect all citizens – including
indigenous peoples – from impunity and violence. If President Morales continues to attack
CICIG and the amnesty legislation passes congress, the indigenous community in Guatemala
will face a heightened risk of violence reminiscent of the early years of the horrific civil war. To
avoid the country falling into state-led violence again, the international community, including the
UN and the Organization of American States should continue to monitor the constitutionality of
President Morales’ actions and continue to support the efforts and existence of the Truth
Commission and CICIG in the country.
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Mistreatment in Nursing Homes through
Antipsychotics
May 3, 2019
By Liz Leman
All over the United States nursing homes are trying to control seniors by putting them on
antipsychotic drugs without any authorization. This practice, unsurprisingly, makes the nurses’
job more convenient because the seniors’ become lethargic (at least). In addition to the legal and
moral issues that stem from this misuse of drugs, the practice also carries disastrous health
repercussions for residents. According to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
antipsychotic drugs are meant to treat psychiatric conditions. Nurses, however, are
administering antipsychotic drugs to seniors – not for its intended purpose – but as an
unwarranted sedative for residents with dementia. The FDA requires manufacturers to label
antipsychotic drugs with the strongest “black box” warning about the risks they pose to people
with dementia because these drugs nearly double the risk of death for residents. One director of
nursing stated that seeing the senior decline on an antipsychotic is “sadder than watching
someone with dementia decline.” This inhumane phenomenon is so widespread that, according
to a report by the Human Rights Watch, every week over 179,000 residents who do not have
diagnoses requiring antipsychotic drugs are still given them. This practice reaches beyond
creating irreversible health repercussions for seniors.
Unnecessarily putting peoples’ parents, grandparents, etc. on drugs without authorization from
the senior or his/her family also violates human rights norms. This widespread phenomenon
blatantly violates the 1987 Nursing Home Reform Act, which provides a Bill of Rights to each
resident to protect rights and ensure a level of care. The Act is supposed to ensure that nursing
home residents a quality of care “that will result in their achieving or maintaining their ‘highest
practicable’ physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being.” Administering antipsychotic drugs
to residents with dementia harnesses the exact opposite effect. Instead of maintaining the
“highest practicable” physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being, this practice increases the
speed of these seniors’ health deterioration. Under this act, the residents have a right to be “fully
informed in advance about care and treatment.” The residents are administered these drugs,
however, without adequate information for them or a family member to properly consent nor the
opportunity to object. For example, a resident of a Texas nursing home explained that she had
no idea she was being given antipsychotic drugs because “they crush it and put it in baby food,
so you don’t know what you’re getting fed.” The 1987 Nursing Home Reform Act also provides
that the residents’ care is free from improper medical treatment.
Abusing antipsychotic drugs, however, by putting lives at danger, is worse than improper
medical treatment. This treatment is inhumane. While there are federal regulations in place to
bar the use of drugs without adequate indication for use, there should be stronger enforcement in
connection to nursing homes. One example of an initiative that is already put in place is the
National Partnership to Improve Dementia Care in Nursing Homes by the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services. The issue remains prevalent, however. One potential reason for the
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continuation of unauthorized administration of antipsychotic drugs in nursing homes is because
initiatives focus too much on the drugs, and less on the root of the problem, the rights of the
residents. The 1987 Nursing Home Reform Act focuses on the rights of the residents, but the
value of this act depends on the effectiveness of its enforcement. Nursing home staff should be
required to learn its principles. Additionally, the US government should work further to enforce
residents’ rights as per the 1987 Nursing Home Reform Act and hold nursing facilities
accountable for their misconduct.
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A Sacrifice Zone: Environmental Justice in
Chile
August 20, 2019
by Valentina Capotosto
In April 2019, the Supreme Court of Chile decided a landmark case in which the court called for
greater enforcement of citizens’ environmental rights. The case was brought after two pollution
incidents exposed 200 residents of Quintero and Puchuncaví to toxic pollutants in 2018. Quintero
and Puchuncavἱ make up one of four “sacrifice zones”—communities plagued by immense
industrial pollution justified by the promise of economic development. Unlimited industrial
development, heavy waste production, and a lack of oversight or mitigation over the past fifty
years have led to the contamination of the air, soil, and water in these communities.
Residents of Quintero and Puchuncaví have battled for their environmental rights for years. In
2011 media attention and outrage garnered over the poisioning of thirty-three school children at
La Greda school. The Chilean Center for Investigative Journalism and Information (CIPER)
linked the pollutants to a state-run mining company, Codelco. Still, insufficient regulations and
industrial growth persisted despite the contamination event at La Greda school. Today, these
communities are described as a “reservoir of chemical waste,” a dystopia where the air is heavy
and black sticky dust settles on every surface.
The case decided this year may be the first legal victory for environmental justice in Quintero
and Puchuncaví after half a century of unfettered industrial growth and environmental
degradation. The plaintiffs included representatives from the National Institute for Human
Rights, Greenpeace, and the Municipalities of Quintero and Puchuncavἱ. In the opinion, the
Chilean Supreme Court criticized government agencies such as the Ministry of the Environment,
Ministry of Health, Valparaiso’s Regional Ministry of Health, and the Office of National
Emergency for systematic negligence. The opinion highlighted the state’s failure to mitigate
pollution, monitor public health, comply with the national emergency plan, and adhere to
international conventions. The court, in condemning responsible state actors, quoted Article 1,
Paragraph 4 of Chile’s Constitution, holding that the duty of the State includes safeguarding
national security, providing protection for families, and ensuring everyone has the right to
participate in national life with equal opportunity.
One important takeaway from this case is that international standards matter in determining the
responsibilities of state actors to enforce environmental rights. In the decision, the court
condemned the Ministry of the Environment for failing to comply with international
environmental conventions such as the Montreal Protocol, the Stockholm Convention, and the
Basel Convention. The Basel Convention, for example, sets environmental standards for
hazardous waste disposal. Insufficient state oversight of industrial waste practices has led to
events such as the pollution incident at the La Greda school in 2011 and the contamination of
Quintero Bay which violate standards for protecting human health and the environment agreed to
in the convention.
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The decision has been praised by Human Rights Watch who contributed to an Amicus Brief
(“HRW Brief”) for the case. The HRW Brief urged the court to consider international law and
international standards in enforcing environmental rights. It advised the court to use the 2018
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Environment’s Framework Principles (“Framework
Principles”) as a guide for enforcing environmental rights, as embodied in Article 19(8) of
Chile's Constitution, which establishes citizens’ right to an environment free from contamination.
The Framework Principles act as an interpretive guide for domestic enforcement of
environmental rights and how states can be held accountable for violations of environmental
rights. Key Framework Principles mentioned in the HRW Brief include requiring assessments of
environmental impact, maintaining substantive environmental standards, and having affordable,
effective, and timely public access to environmental information.
The Chilean Supreme Court’s enforcement of environmental rights through domestic law could
be an important mechanism for environmental justice within Chile as well as internationally.
Future domestic court decisions could establish affirmative responsibilities for state actors to
uphold constitutionally protected environmental rights and international environmental
conventions. For example, the HRW Brief mentioned a case decided by the Supreme Court in
Argentina requiring the government to create mechanisms for access to information, emergency
plans, international compliance, and enforcement oversight. Other trends mentioned in the HRW
Brief include cases enforcing the human right to a healthy environment from the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany.
While this case brings residents of Quintero and Puchuncaví one step closer to achieving
environmental justice, it will likely take much more time to unravel the effects of severe
industrial pollution accumulated over the last fifty years. Yet, this decision furthers a new
potential trend for more courts to hold government actors accountable for upholding
environmental rights. Marcos Orellana, Director for the Environment and Human Rights
Division of Human Rights Watch, wrote an article describing the case as a “cause for hope that
other courts around the world may find a basis in domestic law to uphold the right to a healthy
environment.”
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